





















ERIM REPORT SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
ERIM Report Series reference number  ERS-2007-057-F&A 
Publication   September 2007 
Number of pages  31 
Persistent paper URL   
Email address corresponding author  tnguyen@rsm.nl 
Address   Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
 RSM Erasmus University / Erasmus School of Economics  
 Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
 P.O.Box 1738  
 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Phone:   + 31 10 408 1182   
Fax:  + 31 10 408 9640 
Email:   info@erim.eur.nl 
Internet:   www.erim.eur.nl
 
Bibliographic data and classifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:  
www.erim.eur.nl ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
 
REPORT SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS 
Abstract  We investigate how competitive behavior affects the capital structure of a firm. Theory predicts 
that the impact of different types of output market uncertainty (in particular, unanticipated shocks 
in demand and costs) on a firm’s leverage depends on the type of competition in an industry. We 
test these predictions in a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms by classifying firms into Cournot 
competition (strategic substitutes), and Bertrand competition (strategic complements). We show 
that demand uncertainty is positively related to leverage for firms in both the Cournot and the 
Bertrand sample. Cost uncertainty has a significantly positive impact on the leverage of Cournot 
firms, but plays a negligible role for Bertrand firms. Our results support the strategic use of debt 
and highlight the role of firms’ competitive behavior in the product market in their capital structure 
decisions. 
Free Keywords  Strategic debt, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, demand and cost uncertainty, 
leverage 
Availability  The ERIM Report Series is distributed through the following platforms:  
Academic Repository at Erasmus University (DEAR), DEAR ERIM Series Portal
Social Science Research Network (SSRN), SSRN ERIM Series Webpage
Research Papers in Economics (REPEC), REPEC ERIM Series Webpage
Classifications  The electronic versions of the papers in the ERIM report Series contain bibliographic metadata 
by the following classification systems: 
Library of Congress Classification, (LCC) LCC Webpage
Journal of Economic Literature, (JEL), JEL Webpage
ACM Computing Classification System CCS Webpage










Abe de Jong 
RSM Erasmus University 
ajong@rsm.nl 
 
Thuy Thu Nguyen* 
RSM Erasmus University 
tnguyen@rsm.nl 
 
Mathijs A. van Dijk 


















* Corresponding author: Department of Financial Management, RSM Erasmus University, Room T8-
47,  P.O.  Box  1738,  3000  DR  Rotterdam,  The  Netherlands.  Tel:  +31  10  4082546;  Fax:  +31  10 
4089017.  We  are  indebted  to  Nadja  Guenster,  Felix  Lamp,  Patrick  Verwijmeren,  and  seminar 
participants at Groningen University and RSM Erasmus University for helpful comments. We thank 










We investigate how competitive behavior affects the capital structure of a firm. Theory 
predicts  that  the  impact  of  different  types  of  output  market  uncertainty  (in  particular, 
unanticipated shocks in demand and costs) on a firm’s leverage depends on the type of 
competition in an industry. We test these predictions in a sample of U.S. manufacturing 
firms by classifying firms into Cournot competition (strategic substitutes), and Bertrand 
competition  (strategic  complements).  We  show  that  demand  uncertainty  is  positively 
related to leverage for firms in both the Cournot and the Bertrand sample. Cost uncertainty 
has a significantly positive impact on the leverage of Cournot firms, but plays a negligible 
role for Bertrand firms. Our results support the strategic use of debt and highlight the role 
of firms’ competitive behavior in the product market in their capital structure decisions.  
 
Key words: Strategic debt, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, demand and cost 
uncertainty, leverage 
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1. Introduction 
Financing and output decisions are closely linked. Several theoretical studies (e.g., Brander 
and  Lewis,  1986;  Maksimovic,  1988;  Bolton  and  Scharfstein,  1990;  Showalter,  1995; 
Dasgupta  and  Titman,  1998;  Faure-Grimaud,  2000;  Wanzenried,  2003)  emphasize  the 
strategic role of debt in a firm’s competitive strategy in the output market. An important 
feature of these theoretical models is that the strategic role of debt depends on the firm’s 
competitive environment. In particular, the link between a firm’s capital structure and its 
output market decisions is different in Cournot and Bertrand competition.  
Brander and Lewis (1986) introduce a Cournot competition model to link the choice 
of debt level and output decisions. Because of limited liability, the equity holders of a firm 
that take on debt optimize their output strategy over non-bankruptcy states of the world. 
When the firm faces uncertainty in the output market (e.g., uncertainty about future demand 
or costs), equity holders ignore the bad states of demand or costs in which debt holders 
would suffer. Therefore, they have an incentive to gain a strategic advantage in the output 
market by competing more aggressively. In short, Brander and Lewis (1986) predict that 
Cournot firms subject to demand and/or cost uncertainty have an incentive to commit to a 
large  output  by  using  a  highly  leveraged  capital  structure.  In  a  model  of  Bertrand 
competition, Showalter (1995) shows that different sources of output market uncertainty 
have a different effect on a firm’s capital structure. When demand is uncertain, debt carries 
a strategic advantage. However, when costs are uncertain, Bertrand firms have an incentive 
to reduce their debt level. 
The  models  of  Brander  and  Lewis  (1986)  and  Showalter  (1995)  thus  produce 
testable hypotheses that depend on the type of competition. In Cournot competition, higher 
demand uncertainty leads to higher debt levels, and cost uncertainty also encourages firms   3 
to have a high leverage. In Bertrand competition, higher demand uncertainty induces higher 
debt, while higher cost uncertainty induces firms to choose lower debt levels.  
Empirical  research  on  the  link  between  debt  and  product  market  competition  is 
scarce. Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Phillips (1995), and Kovenock and Phillips (1997) focus 
on a small number of industries in which some firms experience sharp changes in their 
capital  structure.  Lyandres  (2006)  presents  a  model  that  describes  how  the  extent  of 
competitive  interaction  among  firms  influences  the  role  of  strategic  debt.  He  tests  the 
predictions of the model on a large sample of U.S. manufacturing companies.  
To our knowledge, Showalter (1999) is the only study that conducts an empirical 
test of the effect of demand and cost uncertainty on capital structure choice. Showalter 
shows that U.S. manufacturing firms increase debt as demand uncertainty becomes more 
important, but reduce debt as costs become more uncertain. He concludes that his findings 
are consistent with the predictions of models on Bertrand competition, and thus with the 
hypothesis that the firms in his sample engage in Bertrand competition.  
  Despite  the  clear  distinction  that  theoretical  models  make  between  Cournot  and 
Bertrand  competition,  empirical  studies  to  date  do  not  attempt  to  take  the  type  of 
competitive behavior into account. The aim of our study is to test the theoretical predictions 
of Brander and Lewis (1986) and Showalter (1995) and explicitly investigate the different 
implications these models have for firms in Bertrand and Cournot competition. We use the 
competitive  strategy  measure  of  Sundaram,  John  and  John  (1996)  to  characterize  the 
competitive behavior of firms in different industries. This approach allows us to identify 
industries in which the competitive environment can be categorized as either Cournot or 
Bertrand competition. For the samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms, we estimate a capital   4 
structure  model  with  conventional  determinants  of  leverage  and  measures  of  cost  and 
demand uncertainty as explanatory variables. 
For Cournot firms, we find that both demand uncertainty and cost uncertainty are 
significantly  positively  associated  with  leverage.  The  effects  are  statistically  significant 
across  several  different  measures  of  leverage  and  proxies  of  uncertainty.  For  Bertrand 
firms,  demand  uncertainty  has  a  significantly  positive  impact  on  leverage,  but  cost 
uncertainty does not have a significant effect on capital structure. The impact of different 
sources of uncertainty clearly differs in our two samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms. 
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Brander and Lewis 
(1986)  that  higher  demand  and  cost  uncertainty  induce  Cournot  firms  to  increase  debt 
levels. Our evidence also supports the positive impact of demand uncertainty on Bertrand 
firms’ leverage, as predicted by Showalter (1995), but there is no evidence for the role of 
cost uncertainty among these firms. Our analysis underlines the role of strategic debt and 
shows  that  distinguishing  firms  according  to  their  competitive  behavior  is  important. 
Whether firms are competing in Cournot or Bertrand affects the way their capital structure 
choice is influenced by output market uncertainty. 
 
2. Literature 
In this section, we briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on the relation 
between leverage and product market competition.  
Brander  and  Lewis  (1986)  analyze  a  two-stage  Cournot  model.  In  Cournot 
competition,  firms  compete  by  setting  the  quantities  they  produce.  With  locally  linear 
demand curves, Cournot firms compete as strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos and 
Klemperer, 1985). In the first stage of the model, firms decide on the amount of debt. In the   5 
second stage, they compete in the output market.  In this framework, debt commits the 
equity holders of a firm to pursue a more aggressive product market strategy by raising the 
quantity to produce. Because of the limited liability effect, the equity holders of firms that 
take  on  debt  optimize  only  over  non-bankruptcy  states  of  the  world.  If  the  firm  goes 
bankrupt, the equity holders’ losses are limited by the value of their initially contributed 
investment, which is assumed to be zero in this model. Debt holders suffer in the case of a 
shortage of the firm’s returns. A higher dispersion in anticipated levels of either demand or 
costs increases the uncertainty that the firm faces. And higher uncertainty induces equity 
holders in Cournot firms to compete more aggressively by producing more. As a result, 
higher uncertainty, regardless of whether the source is demand or costs, leads to higher 
levels of both output and debt. Debt is always of strategic advantage when Cournot firms 
face demand or cost uncertainty. 
Showalter  (1995)  modifies  Brander  and  Lewis’  (1986)  model  to  the  case  of 
Bertrand competition in which rival firms compete by setting prices. With non-increasing 
marginal  costs,  Bertrand  firms  compete  as  strategic  complements  (Bulow  et  al.,  1985). 
Showalter shows that in this type of competition, the source of output market uncertainty 
plays a crucial role in determining the optimal debt level. With Bertrand competition, debt 
brings  about  a  strategic  advantage  only  when  demand  is  uncertain.  When  this  type  of 
uncertainty is large, high prices are encouraged through high debt levels. By increasing its 
debt, a firm optimizes over good states of the world (i.e., high demand states) and therefore 
chooses a higher equilibrium price. Rival firms react by raising their prices, thus increasing 
the expected profit of the leveraged firms. However, when costs are uncertain, firms that 
take on debt place emphasis on low cost states, and therefore choose a lower equilibrium 
price. The commitment to a lower price induces rival firms to decrease their price, reducing   6 
the  expected  profit  of  the  leveraged  firm.  As  a  result,  Bertrand  firms  facing  high  cost 
uncertainty have no incentive to hold debt. Showalter (1999) argues that in a more general 
model where debt has other advantages, higher cost uncertainty induces Bertrand firms to 
reduce leverage below the optimal debt level that firms would hold in the absence of any 
strategic motive.  
Wanzenried (2003) shows that demand uncertainty (or volatility) also raises a firm’s 
optimal debt level in models of both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the presence of 
differentiated products. She does not take uncertainty on the cost side into account. Haan 
and Toolsema (2007) present a numerical analysis of strategic debt using Wanzenried’s 
(2003) two-stage differentiated goods model with a correction in solving the second stage 
of the model. In contrast to the result of Wanzenried, they find that the equilibrium debt 
level decreases for both Bertrand and Cournot firms as demand becomes more volatile.  
Showalter (1999) is the only empirical study we know that empirically investigates 
the role of demand and cost uncertainty in determining a firm’s capital structure. Showalter 
analyzes a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 1975-1994 and examines 
the relation between leverage and the demand/cost uncertainty that firms face in product 
markets. To measure demand and cost uncertainty, Showalter (1999) proposes an approach 
that uses trend regressions. Demand (cost) uncertainty is calculated as the natural logarithm 
of the standard error of regressions of sales (costs of good sold over sales) on linear and 
non-linear  trends.  His  empirical  results  are  in  line  with  Showalter  (1995).  There  is  a 
positive relation between leverage and demand uncertainty and a negative relation between 
leverage and cost uncertainty. Showalter (1999) concludes that price competition is the 
prevalent competitive behavior in U.S. manufacturing.    7 
The type of competitive behavior plays a crucial role in theoretical models of the 
link between competition and leverage. We are not aware of any studies that explicitly 
allow for the type of competition affecting this link. We contribute to the literature by 
directly  testing  the  predictions  of  models  of  Cournot  and  Bertrand  competition  on  the 
relation between output market uncertainty and capital structure. To that end, we classify 
firms in our empirical analysis into different types of strategic interaction in their industries. 
The hypotheses that we aim to test are as follows. Under Bertrand competition:  
(H1) firms use more debt when demand is more uncertain;  
(H2) firms use less debt when costs are more uncertain.  
Under Cournot competition:  
(H3) firms use more debt when demand is more uncertain;  
(H4) firms use more debt when costs are more uncertain.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Strategic competition measures: complements vs. substitutes 
Sundaram et al. (1996) argue that whether competition occurs in strategic substitutes (SS) 
or strategic complements (SC) depends on the effects of a firm’s moves on its competitor’s 
marginal profits. Suppose two duopolistic firms, A and B, are in an initial equilibrium, i.e., 
both  firms  have  set  marginal  revenues  equal  to  marginal  costs.  If  firm  A  changes  its 
strategy  due  to  an  exogenous  shock,  this  change  affects  its  own  as  well  as  firm  B’s 
marginal profits. To reach a new equilibrium, both firms re-optimize based on the expected 
consequences for their marginal profits. If firm B re-optimizes by competing in SS, then its 
marginal profits must be decreasing. On the contrary, if firm B re-optimizes by competing 
in SC, then its marginal profits must be increasing. Thus, competition in SC and SS can be   8 
distinguished  by  examining  the  sign  of  the  second  derivative  of  firm  A’s  profits  with 
respect to its own and firm B’s strategic variable. 
Sundaram et al. (1996) provide an empirical measure of the type of competition by 
constructing a proxy for the second derivative in the context of R&D competition. Their 






f is the change in a firm’s profit margin (which is the change in net 
income over the change in net sales), and ￿S
c is the change in the competitors’ output.
1 If 
CSM is smaller than zero, then competition is in SS; if CSM is greater than zero, then 
competition is in SC. In the empirical implementation, Sundaram et al. use cutoff points of 
-0.05 and +0.05 to define the sample of SS and SC firms. Lyandres (2006) provides a 
mathematical  proof  for  the  validity  of  this  CSM  measure  as  a  proxy  for  the  nature  of 
product market competition, under the assumption that the firm’s value function remains 
constant in the short-run. In the long-run, an industry-wide shock might change a firm’s 
value function and introduce noise in the relation between the firm’s marginal profit and its 
rivals’ sales. Lyandres (2006) develops a model in which a firm’s leverage is positively 
related to the extent of competitive interaction within its industry. He uses the absolute 
value of CSM as a measure of the extent of interaction. 
We follow the approach of Sundaram et al. (1996) to measure the type of strategic 
competition. We argue that competitive behavior may change over time when firms face 
industry shocks or changes in demand functions. Therefore, we estimate CSM based on 
                                                 
1  Sundaram et al. (1996) include all firms with the same 4-digit SIC except the firm in question in the set 
of competitors.   9 
quarterly data during a relatively short period of time: we require 20 consecutive quarters of 
sales (Compustat data ITEM#2, quarterly database) and profits (ITEM#8).
2  
We use a narrow definition of industries based on their 4-digit SIC. Therefore, we 
argue that it is reasonable to assume that competitive behavior is consistent across firms in 
each  industry-year.  We  derive  a  measure  representative  for  each  industry-year’s 
competition type. After obtaining the CSM measures for each firm-year, we calculate the 
mean and the standard deviation of the CSM for each industry in each year. We use the 
following measures of competitive behavior: (i) SSDUM is a dummy that takes a value of 
one  if  the  industry-year  mean  of  CSM  is  significantly  positive,  and  a  value  of  zero 
otherwise;  (ii)  SCDUM  takes  a  value  of  one  if  the  industry-year  mean  of  CSM  is 
significantly negative, and a value of zero otherwise. We use a 10% significance level. This 
procedure is consistent with Lyandres (2006), although he does not take into account the 
statistical significance. Our approach results in the identification of three separate samples 
of firms: Cournot firms, Bertrand firms, and unidentified firms.
3 
 
3.2. Measures of demand and cost uncertainty 
Following Showalter (1999), we define three demand uncertainty proxies (DEM1, DEM2, 
and DEM3) as the natural logarithm of the standard error of the following trend regressions: 
  t t e t Y + + = 1 0 b b   (1) 
  t t u t t Y + + + =
2
2 1 0 g g g   (2) 




2 1 0 l l l l   (3) 
                                                 
2  Sundaram et al. (1996) use 40 quarters in the empirical estimation of CSM. Lyandres (2006) uses annual 
data for 10 years or more to estimate the extent of strategic interaction. 
3  The unidentified firms have an industry-year CSM which is not significantly different from zero. The 
sample of unidentified firms is not further analyzed in our study.   10 
where Yt is either sales or costs of goods sold divided by sales at time t. Showalter’s (1999) 
assumption behind this approach is that a firm’s sales and costs grow or decline in a fairly 
predictable pattern. Deviations from the anticipated trends represent unanticipated shocks 
to demand or costs. We scale the demand uncertainty proxies by sales to prevent larger 
firms from having a larger uncertainty measure by definition. Our three cost uncertainty 
proxies (COST1, COST2, and COST3) are taken from the same regressions, but with the 
costs of goods sold (ITEM#30) divided by sales in quarter t as dependent variable.  
Showalter (1999) assumes that demand and cost uncertainty are stable over a long 
period of time and he estimates the regressions over his whole sample period, from 1975 to 
1994. We argue that a firm’s demand or cost uncertainty may exhibit important changes 
over time. Therefore, we use quarterly data for five consecutive years in estimating demand 
and  cost  uncertainty.  In  addition,  we  control  for  predictable  seasonal  effects  in  the 
estimation by adding three quarter dummies to regressions (1), (2), and (3).  
 
3.3. Leverage measures  
To facilitate a comparison with Showalter’s (1999) study, we stay close to his choice of 
measures  for  capital  structure  and  other  variables.  As  CSM  and  the  output  market 
uncertainty measures are based on five consecutive years of data, we compute the average 
of  a  firm’s  leverage  and  the  firm-specific  capital  structure  determinants  over  five 
consecutive years as well. We use four measures of leverage, two of which are based on 
book  values  and  two  on  market  values.  The  book  value  of  the  long-term  debt  ratio 
(LDEBTBV) is defined as the average of total long-term debt (Compustat data ITEM#9, 
annual database) over five consecutive years divided by the average of total assets (ITEM 
#6). The market value of the long-term debt ratio (LDEBTMV) is calculated as the average   11 
of total long-term debt divided by the average market value of total assets.
4 The book value 
of the total debt ratio (TDEBTBV) is average total debt (ITEM #9 + ITEM #34) divided by 
average total assets. The market value of the total debt ratio (TDEBTMV) is defined as 
average total debt divided by the average market value of total assets.  
 
3.4. Capital structure determinants 
Empirical capital structure research uses variables related to static trade-off, agency, and 
information  asymmetry  considerations  to  explain  leverage.  In  the  static  trade-off 
framework, the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-assets ratio and moving towards it. 
A  firm’s  capital  structure  is  determined  by  the  trade-off  between  tax  advantages  and 
bankruptcy-related costs. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that the tax advantage of 
debt diminishes as other tax reductions, such as tax and investment tax credits, increase. 
Because these variables act as a tax shield substitute for debt, a negative relation between 
leverage and these non-debt tax shields is expected. The proxy for non-debt tax shields 
used in this study (NDTS) is defined as the ratio of average depreciation (ITEM#125) and 
investment tax credit (ITEM#208) to average total assets. With respect to bankruptcy costs, 
we use the following variables: asset tangibility (higher tangibility of assets indicates lower 
risk for the lender as well as reduced direct costs of bankruptcy), firm risk (higher risk 
indicates higher volatility of earnings and higher probability of bankruptcy), and firm size 
(an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy; larger firms are less likely to face 
financial distress). We measure tangibility (TANG) as the ratio of average net fixed assets 
(ITEM#8) to average total assets; firm risk (RISK) as the standard deviation of the ratio of 
                                                 
4  The measure market value of total assets is calculated as (Total debt + Market value of equity + Preferred 
stock – Deferred taxes and investment credits) = ITEM #9 + ITEM #34 + (ITEM #199*ITEM #54) + ITEM 
#10 – ITEM #35.   12 
operating income before depreciation (ITEM#13) to total assets; and firm size (SIZE) as the 
natural logarithm of average total assets. 
Agency  conflicts  between  equity  holders  and  debt  holders  arise  from  asset-
substitution  and  underinvestment.  To  minimize  these  conflicts,  firms  with  high  growth 
opportunities have a preference for a low leverage, thus seeking equity financing for their 
new projects instead of debt financing. Agency theory predicts that growth opportunities 
are negatively associated with leverage. We use the market-to-book ratio (MTB), defined as 
the average market value of total assets over the average book value of total assets, as a 
proxy for growth opportunities. If debt is not collateralized, equity holders have incentives 
to expropriate wealth from debt holders (Myers, 1977). Creditors may also demand a higher 
interest rate, forcing firms to choose equity instead. Our measure of tangibility can be used 
as a proxy for collateralization, which is expected to be positively related to leverage.  
The  pecking-order  theory  suggests  that  firms  follow  a  specific  hierarchy  in 
financing: they prefer internal over external financing. If external financing is required, a 
firm issues the safest security first. That is, it first issues debt, then hybrid securities such as 
convertible bonds, and equity only as the last resort. It is common to use profitability to test 
the pecking-order theory: more profitable firms are likely to have less leverage as they 
make use of the internally generated fund first. We measure profitability (PROFIT) as the 
average operating income before depreciation divided by the average total assets.  
From  the  asymmetric  information  viewpoint,  bigger  firms  are  likely  to  provide 
better information to the market and are expected to have better access to credit. Hence, 
firm  size  is  expected  to  be  positively  correlated  with  debt  levels.  Liquidity  is  another 
variable  that  determines  the  capital  structure  choice  of  firms.  The  agency  theory  and 
pecking-order theory both predict a negative relation between liquidity and leverage. We   13 
measure  liquidity  (LIQUID)  as  the  ratio  of  average  cash  and  short-term  investments 
(ITEM#1) to average total assets. In addition, we use 2-digit SIC industry dummies in our 
regression  models  to  capture  the  unobservable  influences  of  industry  characteristics  on 
leverage choice of firms with common product lines.
5   
 
3.5. Data 
We obtain firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT North America database for the period 
1985 to 2004. We collect data at two different frequencies: annually and quarterly. At the 
annual frequency, we take all manufacturing firms’ relevant financial information such as 
total assets, tangible assets, profits, debt levels, etc. At the quarterly frequency, we collect 
sales,  profits,  and  costs  of  goods  sold,  all  of  which  are  needed  to  estimate  CSM  and 
demand/cost uncertainty.  
We define competitors as all firms in the COMPUSTAT data base with the same 4-
digit SIC code (ITEM#324) in each particular year. Therefore, we drop the observations 
that do not have records of 4-digit historical SIC. As we focus on U.S. manufacturing firms 
only, we omit observations with historical SIC below 2000 or above 3999. We exclude 
firms in industries concerned with miscellaneous items.
6 Competition within industries is 
the main focus of our study, so the identification of the relevant competitors within the 
same industry is essential. We require firms to have both total assets and sales greater than 
1 million USD. We discard firms without quarterly data for sales, profits, and costs of 
                                                 
5  We  conduct  robustness  checks  by  using  alternative  measures  of  leverage  and  capital  structure 
determinants. For example, we also measure LDEBTBV as the average ratio of long-term debt to the book 
value of total assets (instead of the ratio of the of average long-term debt to the average book value of total 
assets), LDEBTMV as the average ratio of long-term debt to the market value of assets, TANG as the average 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets, PROFIT as the average ratio of operating income to total assets, etc. The 
results are similar.  
6  We do not take these industries as the last 2 digits of the 4-digit SIC code ending with 99 as in MacKay 
and  Phillips  (2005),  but  check  these  industries  manually  to  make  sure  of  the  correct  definitions.  This 
procedure is in line with Clarke (1989) and Campello (2006).   14 
goods sold. We follow MacKay and Phillips (2005) and drop observations with negative 
sales or assets for either annual or quarterly records.  
The data screens yield a final sample of 126 industries, consisting of 14,007 firm-
years and 2,660 distinct firms. We analyze data in three consecutive five-year periods to 
avoid that we use overlapping data for calculating CSM, demand and cost uncertainty, and 
the other variables. We present results that are based on the periods 1989-1994, 1995-1999, 
and 2000-2004.
7 After applying Sundaram et al.’s (1996) approach to measure strategic 
competition,  we  obtain  a  sample  of  Bertrand  firms  that  includes  954  observations  (the 
“Bertrand sample”), and a sample of Cournot firms that includes 633 observations (the 
“Cournot sample”). 
We estimate panel data models with firm random effects to investigate the relation 
between output market uncertainty and leverage.
8 We use time dummies (for three different 
periods) and White standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. The basic regression 
model is as follows: 
+ + + + + + = ￿
=
it it it it
i
i i it NDTS RISK SIZE TANG INDUSTRY LEV 23 22 21 20
19
1
0 b b b b b b  
  + it it it it it it COST DEM LIQUID MTB PROFIT e b b b b b + + + + + 28 27 26 25 24   (4) 
where LEV is the proxy for leverage; INDUSTRYi are the industry dummies for 2-digit SIC 
industries;  DEM  and  COST  represent  the  demand  and  cost  uncertainty  proxies  DEM1, 
DEM2, DEM3 and COST1, COST2, COST3, respectively. The other explanatory variables 
are described above. In a robustness check, we include a measure of competition intensity, 
                                                 
7  Other combinations of 3 consecutive periods are used for robustness checks: (i) 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 
and 1997-2001; (ii) 1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1998-2002; and (iii) 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. 
We find similar results. 
8  A Hausman test shows that the differences between the coefficients in the fixed and random effects panel 
models are not statistically significant.   15 
the  absolute  value  of  industry-average  CSM,  as  an  additional  explanatory  variable  as 
suggested by Lyandres (2006). 
 
4. Empirical analysis of the link between leverage and demand/cost uncertainty 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of firm characteristics in the Bertrand and Cournot 
samples.  Many  firm  characteristics  differ  significantly  across  both  samples.  Generally, 
firms competing as strategic substitutes are smaller, less prone to business risk, and more 
profitable, and have smaller fixed assets, fewer growth opportunities, and less liquidity. 
Average demand and cost uncertainty are lower for firms in the Cournot sample compared 
to the Bertrand sample.  
Table 2 presents correlations between the variables in the Bertrand sample (Panel 
A) and the Cournot sample (Panel B). Similar to Showalter (1999), we observe that the 
highest  correlations  between  the  explanatory  variables  are  those  between  PROFIT  and 
DEM/COST  in  both  samples.  The  relatively  high  and  negative  correlations  between 
profitability and both sources of uncertainty indicate that firms that experience less cost and 
demand uncertainty on average have higher profits. A potential explanation is that under 
predictable output market conditions, firms are better able to anticipate optimal capacity 
and inventory levels. Liquidity has a large, positive correlation with both DEM and COST 
in the Bertrand sample, while in the Cournot sample only the correlation between LIQUID 
and COST is relatively  high. This may be explained by the fact that firms facing high 
output market uncertainty have a greater need for liquid assets in order to be well prepared 
for poor states of the world. 
  In  Table  3,  we  report  the  averages  of  the  leverage  and  the  demand  and  cost 
uncertainty measures for the industries included in the Bertrand and Cournot samples. The   16 
Bertrand (Cournot) sample consists of 24 (21) 4-digit SIC industries. Within each sample, 
industries are presented in order of descending long-term debt ratios based on book values. 
The table also shows the rank order for each of the variables, with 1 as the highest value.  
Within the Bertrand sample, the industries with the highest average leverage ratios 
correspond to those characterized by low demand and cost uncertainty. The low leverage 
industries generally have relatively high demand and cost uncertainty. The industries that 
we classify as Bertrand and that have the highest debt levels include plastics (SIC 3081, 
3086), alcohol (SIC 2084), and fabrics (SIC 2211); the lowest average leverage is observed 
in the semiconductor service (SIC 3674), telegraph apparatus (SIC 3661), and biological 
diagnostics (SIC 2836) industries. 
Within the Cournot sample, we observe high average debt ratios in the paperboard 
(SIC 2631), aluminum (SIC 3334), steel works (SIC 3321), and insulating nonferrous wire 
(SIC 3357) industries; and low leverage in the electro-medical apparatus (SIC 3845), lab 
analytical instruments (SIC 3826), and magnetic optical recording (SIC 3695) industries. 
The industries competing in Cournot with the highest leverage appear to have medium or 
relatively high levels of uncertainty  in both demand and  costs. Clearly, the association 
between  DEM/COST  and  leverage  varies  systematically  across  the  two  samples  with 
different competitive behavior. 
  Table 4 reports the estimation results of our capital structure regressions. For each 
sample, and for each of the four measures of leverage, we estimate three panel models with 
three different proxies of demand and cost uncertainty as independent variables (in addition 
to the conventional determinants of capital structure used in previous studies). The results 
are consistent across different leverage proxies, but the statistical significance is somewhat 
stronger when market-value measures of leverage are used.   17 
  The regressions based on the Bertrand sample (see Panel A) support hypothesis H1, 
which  states  that  Bertrand  firms  facing  higher  demand  uncertainty  use  more  debt.  The 
results show that demand uncertainty indeed has a positive impact on the debt ratio of 
Bertrand firms, consistent with the theoretical models of Showalter (1995) and Wanzenried 
(2003).  The  coefficient  of  the  DEM  measures  is  significantly  positive  for  all  leverage 
proxies, except for LDEBTBV. The economic impact of demand uncertainty is substantial. 
For  example,  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  DEM1  is  associated  with  a  10.2% 
increase in the average TDEBTMV of Bertrand firms. 
Showalter (1995, 1999) contends that cost uncertainty is negatively associated with 
debt within Bertrand competition. However, the regressions for Bertrand firms indicate that 
none  of  the  cost  uncertainty  proxies  has  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  leverage. 
Coefficients  are  also  not  consistently  negative  across  the  panel  models  and  they  are 
generally very close to zero. We find no support for hypothesis H2. 
  With regard to the control variables in our  Bertrand sample regressions, TANG, 
SIZE, PROFIT, MTB, and LIQUID show significant coefficients with the correct signs as 
predicted  in  the  capital  structure  literature.  The  effect  of  the  other  variables  is  not 
significant, although they have the expected sign in most cases.  
  In the Cournot sample, the results show a positive and statistically significant effect 
of both demand and cost uncertainty on leverage in all 12 regression models (see Panel B). 
Hence,  we  find  evidence  that  both  demand  uncertainty  and  cost  uncertainty  encourage 
Cournot firms to use strategic debt, consistent with hypotheses H3 and H4. These results 
are in line with the argument of Brander and Lewis (1986) that in the presence of output 
market uncertainty, firms have an incentive to have a high leverage to commit to aggressive 
competition. This aggressiveness induces their rival firms to reduce output, and raises the   18 
expected profit of the leveraged firms. These effects are also significant from an economic 
point of view. A one standard deviation increase in DEM1 (COST1) is associated with a 
14.3% (13.3%) increase in the average TDEBTMV of Cournot firms. The coefficients on 
the control variables in the regressions based on the Cournot sample are in line with the 
capital structure literature. 
  To investigate whether the coefficients of the demand and cost uncertainty measures 
and the control variables differ significantly across the Bertrand and Cournot samples, we 
run regressions with the same specification as in Table 4, but based on all observations in 
the two samples together and including interaction terms of all variables with SSDUM.
9 The 
results indicate that the coefficients of the cost uncertainty measures are significantly larger 
for Cournot firms than for Bertrand firms. Demand uncertainty does not significantly differ 
in terms of its impact on leverage across these two types of firms. The results are consistent 
with our main finding that demand uncertainty affects the leverage of all firms, but cost 
uncertainty is important for Cournot firms and not for Bertrand firms.  
  As a robustness check, we run all regressions in Table 4 with the absolute value of 
industry-average CSM as an additional explanatory variable. Lyandres (2006) suggests that 
there is a significantly positive relation between leverage and the extent of competitive 
interactions in the industry, regardless of the type of competitive behavior. The inclusion of 
the absolute value of industry-average CSM does not change our results. The demand and 
cost uncertainty proxies yield results that are consistent with Table 4: both DEM and COST 
measures have a significantly positive impact on the debt ratios of Cournot firms, while 
only demand uncertainty affects the leverage of Bertrand firms positively. The effect of the 
absolute value of industry-average CSM is statistically negligible in most of our regressions 
                                                 
9  The results are not reported in the paper, but are available from the authors on request.   19 
after controlling for demand and cost uncertainty. The exceptions are the three regressions 
with TDEBT as the dependent variable in the Cournot sample, in which the absolute value 
of CSM is positively associated with the debt ratio, consistent with Lyandres (2006). 
In short, our results indicate that the competitive behavior of firms affects the link 
between output market uncertainty and a firm’s capital structure choice. 
  
5. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the limited empirical literature on the relation between a firm’s 
capital structure decisions and its behavior in the product market. We investigate whether 
the type of competitive behavior (i.e., strategic complements or substitutes) plays a role in 
determining  the  impact  of  demand  and  cost  uncertainty  on  leverage.  While  theoretical 
models of strategic debt explicitly distinguish between Cournot and Bertrand competition, 
empirical  studies  neglect  this  distinction  in  their  analysis  of  the  relation  between 
competition and leverage.  
By estimating a measure for competitive strategy developed by previous studies, we 
categorize firms into two samples: a sample with firms competing in Bertrand (strategic 
complements) and a sample with firms competing in Cournot (strategic substitutes). We 
find that the samples of Bertrand and Cournot firms differ systematically in terms of firm 
characteristics.  The  industries  included  in  the  Bertrand  and  Cournot  samples  show  a 
different association between demand and cost uncertainty and average debt ratios. 
We estimate a conventional capital structure regression for each of the two samples 
and include proxies of demand and cost uncertainty to investigate the strategic use of debt 
in  different  competitive  environments.  We  show  that  for  firms  that  engage  in  Cournot 
competition,  both  demand  and  cost  uncertainty  are  positively  associated  with  leverage,   20 
consistent with Brander and Lewis (1986). This result supports the argument that under 
limited liability, Cournot firms facing output market uncertainty use debt to commit to a 
large output in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage in the product market. For firms that 
are characterized by Bertrand competition, cost uncertainty does not significantly affect 
leverage, but demand uncertainty induces a higher debt ratio. This latter finding is in line 
with the prediction of Showalter (1995) that higher demand uncertainty is associated with 
higher debt in Bertrand firms. 
  Overall, we show that the strategic aspects of capital structure choice are important 
and that the type of competition matters for the role of output market uncertainty in the link 
between financing and output decisions.   21 
References 
Bolton,  P.,  Scharfstein,  D.,  1990.  A  theory  of  predation  based  on  agency  problems  in 
financial contracting. American Economic Review 80, 93-106. 
Brander, J., Lewis, T., 1986. Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect. 
American Economic Review 76, 956-970. 
Bulow,  J.,  Geanakoplos,  J.,  Klemperer,  P.,  1985.  Multimarket  oligopoly:  strategic 
substitutes and complements. Journal of Political Economy 93, 488-511. 
Campello, M., 2006. Debt financing: Does it boost or hurt firm performance in product 
market? Journal of Financial Economics 82, 135-172. 
Clarke, R., 1989. SICs as delineators of economic markets. Journal of Business 62, 17-31. 
Chevalier, J., 1995a. Capital structure and product-market competition: empirical evidence 
from the supermarket industry. American Economic Review 85, 415-435. 
Chevalier, J., 1995b. Do  LBO supermarkets charge more: An empirical analysis of the 
effects of LBOs on supermarket pricing. Journal of Finance 50, 1095-1113. 
Dasgupta, S., Titman, S. 1998. Pricing strategy and financial policy. Review of Financial 
Studies 11, 705-737. 
DeAngelo, H., Masulis, R., 1980. Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal 
taxation. Journal of Financial Economics 8, 3-29. 
Faure-Grimaud,  A.,  2000.  Product-market  competition  and  optimal  debt  contracts:  The 
limited liability effect revisited. European Economic Review 44, 1823-1840. 
Haan, M.A., Toolsema, L.A., 2007. The strategic use of debt reconsidered. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, forthcoming. 
Kovenock,  D.,  Phillips,  G.,  1997.  Capital  structure  and  product  market  behavior:  An 
examination of plant exit and investment decisions. Review of Financial Studies 3, 
767-803.  
Lyandres, E., 2006. Capital structure and interaction among firms in output markets: theory 
and evidence. Journal of Business 79, 2381-2421. 
MacKay, P., Phillips, G., 2005. How does industry affect firm financial structure? Review 
of Financial Studies 18, 1432-1466. 
Myers, S., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5, 
147-175.   22 
Phillips, G., 1995. Increased debt and industry  product markets: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics 37, 189-238. 
Showalter,  D.,  1995.  Oligopoly  and  financial  structure:  Comment.  American  Economic 
Review 85, 647-653. 
Showalter, D., 1999. Strategic debt: Evidence in manufacturing. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 17, 319-333. 
Sundaram, A., John, T., John, K., 1996. An empirical analysis of strategic competition and 
firm values – The case of R&D competition. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 
459-486. 
Wanzenried, G., 2003. Capital structure decisions and output market competition under 
demand uncertainty. International Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 171-200.   23 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for all variables used in this study and compares the means across the Bertrand and Cournot samples. the variable 
definitions are as follows. LDEBTBV: book value of long-term debt ratio, defined as average total long-term debt divided by average total assets. 
TDEBTBV: book value of total debt ratio, defined as average total debt divided by average total assets. LDEBTMV: market value of long-term debt ratio, 
defined as the average total long-term debt divided by the average market value of total assets (which is calculated as total debt plus market value of 
equity plus preferred stock minus deferred taxes and investment credits). TDEBTMV: market value of total debt ratio, defined as the average total debt 
divided by the average market value of total assets. TANG: tangibility, defined as the ratio of average net fixed assets to average total assets. SIZE: firm 
size, defined as the natural log of average total assets. RISK: firm business risk, defined as the standard deviation of the ratio between operating income 
before depreciation to total assets. NDTS: non-debt tax shields, defined as the ratio of average depreciation and investment tax credit to average total 
assets. PROFIT: profitability, defined as the average operating income before depreciation divided by average total assets. MTB: market-to-book ratio, 
defined as the average market value of total assets over average total assets. LIQUID: liquidity, defined as the ratio of average cash and short-term 
investments to average total assets. DEM1, DEM2, and DEM3: demand uncertainty proxies, defined as the natural log of the standard error (scaled by 
sales) of trend regressions (1), (2), and (3) with sales as the dependent variable. COST1, COST2, and COST3: cost uncertainty proxies, defined as the 




# obs. = 954   
Cournot sample 
# obs. = 633   
Mean comparison 
(Cournot – Bertrand) 
  Mean  Stdev  Min  Max    Mean  Stdev  Min  Max    difference  p-value 
LDEBTBV  0.156  0.174  0.000  1.145    0.136  0.157  0.000  1.710    -0.020  0.021 
TDEBTBV  0.208  0.221  0.000  1.915    0.183  0.183  0.000  1.778    -0.025  0.018 
LDEBTMV  0.121  0.159  0.000  0.885    0.138  0.177  0.000  0.837    0.017  0.046 
TDEBTMV  0.159  0.193  0.000  1.097    0.180  0.210  0.000  1.033    0.021  0.037 
TANG  0.245  0.193  0.000  0.874    0.208  0.161  0.011  0.750    -0.037  0.000 
SIZE  5.257  2.285  0.062  12.001    4.874  2.169  0.078  10.433    -0.383  0.001 
RISK  0.102  0.150  0.003  2.445    0.087  0.112  0.004  1.010    -0.015  0.037 
NDTS  0.046  0.028  0.000  0.313    0.048  0.030  0.005  0.365    0.002  0.194 
PROFIT  0.003  0.250  -2.453  0.497    0.038  0.203  -1.129  0.417    0.035  0.004 
MTB  2.486  2.213  0.230  25.333    1.914  1.835  0.156  24.779    -0.572  0.000 
LIQUID  0.293  0.276  0.000  0.953    0.196  0.190  0.000  0.858    -0.097  0.000 
DEM1  -3.149  1.011  -6.125  1.574    -3.399  0.858  -5.634  0.018    -0.250  0.000 
DEM2  -3.367  1.074  -6.096  1.333    -3.655  0.921  -6.274  -0.020    -0.288  0.000 
DEM3  -3.464  1.091  -6.073  1.358    -3.753  0.929  -6.258  -0.016    -0.289  0.000 
COST1  -1.944  2.389  -5.259  6.786    -2.786  1.333  -5.024  4.903    -0.842  0.000 
COST2  -2.031  2.401  -5.409  6.781    -2.888  1.363  -5.189  4.797    -0.857  0.000 
COST3  -2.092  2.408  -5.378  6.824    -2.954  1.372  -5.393  4.824    -0.862  0.000 
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Table 2: Correlations 
 
This table presents the correlations between all variables used in this study. Variable definitions are discussed in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Bertrand sample (# obs. = 954)                     
  LDEBTBV  TDEBTBV  LDEBTMV  TDEBTMV  TANG  SIZE  RISK  NDTS  PROFIT  MTB  LIQUID  DEM1  DEM2  DEM3  COST1  COST2  COST3 
LDEBTBV  1.000                                 
TDEBTBV  0.841  1.000                               
LDEBTMV  0.758  0.632  1.000                             
TDEBTMV  0.674  0.738  0.925  1.000                           
TANG  0.297  0.292  0.432  0.419  1.000                         
SIZE  0.188  0.071  0.227  0.146  0.349  1.000                       
RISK  -0.080  -0.019  -0.225  -0.201  -0.251  -0.381  1.000                     
NDTS  0.130  0.187  0.174  0.204  0.380  0.075  0.036  1.000                   
PROFIT  0.063  0.027  0.216  0.203  0.320  0.442  -0.629  -0.046  1.000                 
MTB  -0.134  -0.148  -0.411  -0.438  -0.292  -0.192  0.332  -0.122  -0.361  1.000               
LIQUID  -0.293  -0.362  -0.480  -0.531  -0.590  -0.296  0.383  -0.327  -0.576  0.437  1.000             
DEM1  -0.109  -0.090  -0.211  -0.204  -0.302  -0.321  0.419  -0.026  -0.607  0.212  0.581  1.000           
DEM2  -0.108  -0.092  -0.205  -0.198  -0.278  -0.324  0.395  -0.038  -0.610  0.191  0.569  0.965  1.000         
DEM3  -0.113  -0.097  -0.207  -0.202  -0.284  -0.325  0.389  -0.035  -0.610  0.198  0.569  0.954  0.986  1.000       
COST1  -0.098  -0.102  -0.263  -0.271  -0.328  -0.345  0.491  -0.119  -0.742  0.328  0.661  0.694  0.692  0.692  1.000     
COST2  -0.097  -0.100  -0.259  -0.265  -0.323  -0.347  0.487  -0.116  -0.740  0.322  0.655  0.695  0.695  0.695  0.998  1.000   
COST3  -0.094  -0.096  -0.256  -0.261  -0.321  -0.347  0.485  -0.116  -0.739  0.320  0.650  0.695  0.696  0.697  0.996  0.999  1.000 
                                   
Panel B: Cournot sample (# obs. = 633)                     
  LDEBTBV  TDEBTBV  LDEBTMV  TDEBTMV  TANG  SIZE  RISK  NDTS  PROFIT  MTB  LIQUID  DEM1  DEM2  DEM3  COST1  COST2  COST3 
LDEBTBV  1.000                                 
TDEBTBV  0.911  1.000                               
LDEBTMV  0.812  0.736  1.000                             
TDEBTMV  0.745  0.788  0.946  1.000                           
TANG  0.356  0.295  0.505  0.450  1.000                         
SIZE  0.334  0.203  0.409  0.317  0.454  1.000                       
RISK  -0.216  -0.111  -0.252  -0.217  -0.275  -0.460  1.000                     
NDTS  -0.033  0.010  -0.047  -0.031  0.171  -0.102  0.186  1.000                   
PROFIT  0.192  0.088  0.193  0.157  0.310  0.460  -0.713  -0.276  1.000                 
MTB  -0.233  -0.230  -0.393  -0.420  -0.255  -0.225  0.319  0.033  -0.252  1.000               
LIQUID  -0.460  -0.498  -0.519  -0.558  -0.492  -0.358  0.345  -0.116  -0.398  0.417  1.000             
DEM1  -0.083  0.012  -0.088  -0.021  -0.271  -0.450  0.497  0.123  -0.552  0.086  0.279  1.000           
DEM2  -0.099  0.010  -0.104  -0.028  -0.300  -0.480  0.481  0.113  -0.555  0.062  0.272  0.942  1.000         
DEM3  -0.103  0.001  -0.113  -0.040  -0.308  -0.490  0.486  0.120  -0.557  0.065  0.272  0.923  0.983  1.000       
COST1  -0.132  -0.064  -0.151  -0.116  -0.243  -0.406  0.562  0.117  -0.607  0.226  0.436  0.592  0.582  0.580  1.000     
COST2  -0.130  -0.059  -0.146  -0.109  -0.252  -0.417  0.557  0.113  -0.600  0.226  0.422  0.587  0.586  0.587  0.992  1.000   
COST3  -0.126  -0.053  -0.143  -0.104  -0.249  -0.418  0.549  0.118  -0.596  0.227  0.409  0.583  0.583  0.586  0.986  0.996  1.000   25 
Table 3: Industry averages and ranks 
 
This table presents the industry averages and ranks of four measures of leverage and three measures of both demand and cost uncertainty in the Bertrand 
and Cournot samples. Variable definitions are discussed in Table 1. The 4-digit SIC industry descriptions are taken from Compustat documentation. 
 
Panel A: Bertrand sample (# obs. = 954)                                   
SIC  Industry description  Obs.  LDEBTBV/rank  TDEBTBV/rank  LDEBTMV/rank  TDEBTMV/rank  DEM1/rank  DEM2/rank  DEM3/rank  COST1/rank  COST2/rank  COST3/rank 
3081  Unsupp plastics film & sheet  17  0.368  1  0.441  2  0.379  3  0.446  4  -3.715  15  -3.902  12  -3.993  12  -2.711  7  -2.727  7  -2.768  6 
3086  Plastics foam products  8  0.365  2  0.498  1  0.387  2  0.544  1  -3.922  22  -4.050  18  -4.073  15  -3.107  11  -3.277  13  -3.316  12 
2084  Wine, brandy & brandy spirits  10  0.349  3  0.407  3  0.356  4  0.417  5  -3.910  21  -4.059  19  -4.130  20  -3.431  19  -3.481  17  -3.544  18 
2421  Sawmills, planing mills, gen  7  0.345  4  0.390  4  0.307  6  0.352  6  -3.639  12  -3.918  14  -4.017  14  -3.388  17  -3.558  20  -3.584  20 
3532  Mng machy, eq, ex oil field  2  0.315  5  0.338  7  0.212  12  0.231  13  -3.699  13  -4.124  22  -4.173  21  -3.335  15  -3.386  15  -3.356  14 
2211  Broadwoven fabric mill, cotton  16  0.312  6  0.377  5  0.404  1  0.491  3  -3.803  19  -4.013  15  -4.115  18  -3.384  16  -3.426  16  -3.511  17 
3444  Sheet metal work  5  0.277  7  0.376  6  0.344  5  0.511  2  -2.909  3  -3.356  5  -3.469  5  -2.775  8  -2.831  8  -2.847  8 
3531  Construction machinery & eq  18  0.222  8  0.279  10  0.218  11  0.272  11  -3.422  8  -3.843  11  -4.015  13  -3.643  23  -3.741  23  -3.780  23 
2911  Petroleum refining  74  0.219  9  0.262  13  0.268  7  0.311  8  -3.439  9  -3.574  8  -3.685  6  -3.154  13  -3.218  11  -3.252  11 
2821  Plastics, resins, elastomers  19  0.217  10  0.263  12  0.246  10  0.296  9  -3.741  16  -4.020  16  -4.114  17  -3.558  21  -3.690  22  -3.765  22 
2052  Cookies & crackers  4  0.213  11  0.226  16  0.255  9  0.271  12  -3.881  20  -4.045  17  -4.128  19  -3.712  24  -3.843  24  -4.059  24 
3317  Steel pipe and tubes  13  0.205  12  0.256  14  0.262  8  0.330  7  -3.291  6  -3.556  6  -3.741  8  -3.068  10  -3.232  12  -3.346  13 
3585  Air-cond, heating, refrig eq  27  0.204  13  0.286  8  0.197  13  0.280  10  -3.929  23  -4.231  23  -4.377  24  -3.474  20  -3.521  19  -3.557  19 
2673  Plastic, foil, coated paper bags  2  0.182  14  0.263  11  0.172  15  0.221  15  -3.700  14  -4.321  24  -4.286  23  -2.500  5  -2.533  5  -2.594  4 
2082  Malt beverages  14  0.156  15  0.184  20  0.104  17  0.124  19  -3.968  24  -4.104  21  -4.258  22  -3.574  22  -3.685  21  -3.759  21 
2834  Pharmaceutical preparations  275  0.153  16  0.204  18  0.068  22  0.092  21  -3.059  4  -3.268  3  -3.365  3  -1.239  2  -1.343  2  -1.405  2 
3812  Srch, det, nav, guid, aero sys  43  0.152  17  0.198  19  0.175  14  0.221  16  -3.548  11  -3.792  10  -3.899  10  -3.119  12  -3.194  10  -3.241  10 
3634  Electric housewares & fans  13  0.145  18  0.215  17  0.152  16  0.222  14  -3.766  17  -3.911  13  -3.932  11  -3.324  14  -3.372  14  -3.477  15 
2836  Biological pds, ex diagnostics  116  0.133  19  0.153  22  0.046  24  0.053  24  -2.311  1  -2.486  1  -2.543  1  1.070  1  1.002  1  0.949  1 
2024  Ice cream & frozen desserts  13  0.124  20  0.169  21  0.088  18  0.113  20  -3.784  18  -4.060  20  -4.103  16  -3.399  18  -3.490  18  -3.487  16 
3674  Semiconductor, related service  93  0.108  21  0.131  23  0.069  21  0.087  23  -2.804  2  -3.064  2  -3.157  2  -2.400  3  -2.487  3  -2.584  3 
3651  household audio & video eq  31  0.092  22  0.234  15  0.085  19  0.198  17  -3.378  7  -3.583  9  -3.789  9  -2.603  6  -2.721  6  -2.793  7 
3821  Lab apparatus & furniture  20  0.081  23  0.280  9  0.073  20  0.175  18  -3.503  10  -3.571  7  -3.690  7  -3.005  9  -3.037  9  -3.072  9 
3661  Tele & telegraph apparatus  114  0.077  24  0.127  24  0.056  23  0.090  22  -3.086  5  -3.350  4  -3.431  4  -2.443  4  -2.533  4  -2.597  5 
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Table 3, continued 
 
Panel B: Cournot sample (# obs. = 633)                                   
SIC  Industry description  Obs.  LDEBTBV/rank  TDEBTBV/rank  LDEBTMV/rank  TDEBTMV/rank  DEM1/rank  DEM2/rank  DEM3/rank  COST1/rank  COST2/rank  COST3/rank 
2631  Paperboard mills  13  0.381  1  0.428  1  0.469  2  0.548  1  -3.806  16  -4.020  16  -4.081  14  -2.781  6  -2.865  6  -2.922  7 
3743  Railroad equipment  6  0.325  2  0.389  2  0.315  4  0.390  4  -3.315  10  -3.686  11  -3.800  12  -3.541  16  -3.593  16  -3.664  16 
3334  Prim production of aluminum  8  0.292  3  0.316  3  0.486  1  0.523  2  -4.116  17  -4.429  17  -4.558  17  -3.727  18  -3.973  18  -4.048  18 
3357  Drawing, insulating nonfer wire  6  0.243  4  0.284  5  0.268  5  0.312  6  -2.792  1  -3.000  1  -3.322  4  -2.782  7  -2.881  7  -2.893  6 
3312  Steel works & blast furnaces  66  0.235  5  0.272  6  0.353  3  0.411  3  -3.502  13  -3.894  13  -4.023  13  -3.146  13  -3.280  13  -3.347  13 
2711  Newspaper: pubg, pubg & print  48  0.228  6  0.253  9  0.184  8  0.204  11  -4.248  19  -4.600  21  -4.656  20  -3.564  17  -3.670  17  -3.743  17 
2851  Paints, varnishes, lacquers  19  0.202  7  0.240  11  0.160  11  0.189  13  -4.234  18  -4.560  19  -4.579  19  -3.910  20  -4.028  19  -4.111  19 
2085  Distilled & blended liquor  2  0.192  8  0.269  7  0.134  12  0.193  12  -4.400  21  -4.545  18  -4.562  18  -4.498  21  -4.465  21  -4.433  21 
3652  Phono recrds, audio tape, disk  6  0.180  9  0.252  10  0.166  10  0.224  9  -3.337  11  -3.694  12  -3.744  11  -3.027  11  -3.059  10  -3.129  9 
3724  Aircraft engine, engine parts  19  0.178  10  0.225  12  0.244  6  0.303  7  -3.714  14  -3.964  14  -4.189  16  -3.052  12  -3.096  11  -3.169  11 
3949  Sporting & athletic goods, nec  24  0.163  11  0.300  4  0.195  7  0.315  5  -3.050  6  -3.271  6  -3.400  6  -2.659  5  -2.726  5  -2.741  5 
3442  Metal doors, frames, mold, trim  6  0.155  12  0.177  14  0.131  13  0.152  14  -4.346  20  -4.599  20  -4.726  21  -3.795  19  -4.098  20  -4.168  20 
3942  Dolls & stuffed toys  10  0.152  13  0.255  8  0.120  14  0.215  10  -3.292  9  -3.503  9  -3.645  9  -3.333  15  -3.410  15  -3.478  15 
3555  Printing trades machy, equip  15  0.123  14  0.209  13  0.167  9  0.296  8  -2.977  3  -3.169  3  -3.202  1  -3.010  10  -3.098  12  -3.169  10 
3577  Computer peripheral eq, nec  62  0.093  15  0.138  15  0.066  18  0.096  19  -3.179  7  -3.455  8  -3.513  7  -2.464  4  -2.560  3  -2.641  3 
3826  Lab analytical instruments  37  0.089  16  0.130  18  0.053  20  0.079  20  -3.774  15  -3.995  15  -4.129  15  -2.792  8  -2.885  8  -2.959  8 
3663  Radio, TV broadcast, comm eq  117  0.082  17  0.130  17  0.066  19  0.102  18  -3.017  5  -3.209  5  -3.323  5  -2.456  2  -2.553  2  -2.612  2 
3845  Electromedical apparatus  110  0.081  18  0.115  20  0.045  21  0.066  21  -3.213  8  -3.443  7  -3.522  8  -2.071  1  -2.157  1  -2.234  1 
3823  Industrial measurement instr  51  0.080  19  0.124  19  0.082  17  0.123  17  -3.409  12  -3.618  10  -3.699  10  -3.202  14  -3.343  14  -3.381  14 
2741  Miscellaneous publishing  4  0.075  20  0.096  21  0.112  15  0.133  16  -3.010  4  -3.150  2  -3.298  3  -2.461  3  -2.596  4  -2.644  4 
3695  Magnetic, optic recordng media  4  0.074  21  0.138  16  0.083  16  0.150  15  -2.959  2  -3.179  4  -3.242  2  -2.925  9  -3.054  9  -3.225  12   27 
Table 4: Capital structure regressions with demand and cost uncertainty 
 
This table presents the results of 12 panel data regressions of leverage on conventional capital structure determinants and measures of demand and cost 
uncertainty.  Data  are  from  three  consecutive  periods:  1990-1994,  1995-1999,  and  2000-2004.  All  models  include  firm  random  effects.  Variable 
definitions are discussed in Table 1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. White standard errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Panel A: Bertrand sample 
  LDEBTBV    TDEBTBV    LDEBTMV    TDEBTMV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)    (10)  (11)  (12) 
TANG  0.091*  0.090*  0.091*    0.124*  0.122*  0.124*    0.042  0.041  0.042    0.046  0.045  0.047 
  (0.072)  (0.075)  (0.073)    (0.070)  (0.074)  (0.071)    (0.315)  (0.323)  (0.314)    (0.329)  (0.341)  (0.327) 
SIZE  0.016***  0.015***  0.015***    0.008**  0.008**  0.008**    0.008***  0.008***  0.008***    0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.021)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.373)  (0.387)  (0.395) 
RISK  -0.003  0.001  0.001    0.053  0.060  0.061    -0.050  -0.047  -0.047    -0.048  -0.044  -0.043 
  (0.952)  (0.988)  (0.979)    (0.234)  (0.195)  (0.189)    (0.129)  (0.139)  (0.14)    (0.136)  (0.163)  (0.164) 
NDTS  -0.037  -0.020  -0.019    0.004  0.035  0.036    -0.076  -0.058  -0.060    -0.116  -0.092  -0.093 
  (0.873)  (0.931)  (0.936)    (0.992)  (0.915)  (0.915)    (0.659)  (0.735)  (0.728)    (0.653)  (0.723)  (0.718) 
PROFIT  -0.139***  -0.139***  -0.139***    -0.202***  -0.201***  -0.200***    -0.112***  -0.113***  -0.112***    -0.150***  -0.149***  -0.148*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MTB  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002    -0.003  -0.003  -0.003    -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.015***    -0.020***  -0.020***  -0.020*** 
  (0.465)  (0.463)  (0.444)    (0.261)  (0.266)  (0.245)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LIQUID  -0.189***  -0.185***  -0.183***    -0.384***  -0.378***  -0.376***    -0.168***  -0.164***  -0.163***    -0.289***  -0.284***  -0.284*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DEM1  0.012        0.023**        0.011**        0.016***     
  (0.115)        (0.015)        (0.034)        (0.007)     
COST1  -0.001        -0.001        -0.002        -0.002     
  (0.875)        (0.852)        (0.323)        (0.492)     
DEM2    0.009        0.018**        0.006        0.011**   
    (0.197)        (0.037)        (0.183)        (0.045)   
COST2    0.000        0.000        -0.002        -0.001   
    (0.922)        (0.981)        (0.501)        (0.738)   
DEM3      0.007        0.015*        0.006        0.010*** 
      (0.319)        (0.088)        (0.187)        (0.070) 
COST3      0.000        0.001        -0.002        -0.001 
      (0.927)        (0.848)        (0.532)        (0.828) 
No. (2-digit SIC)                               
industry dummies  12  12  12    12  12  12    12  12  12    12  12  12 
Obs  954  954  954    954  954  954    954  954  954    954  954  954 
Between R
2  0.472  0.473  0.457    0.985  0.987  0.983    0.996  0.997  0.997    0.998  0.998  0.998 
Overall R
2  0.208  0.207  0.206    0.234  0.233  0.232    0.425  0.424  0.424    0.458  0.456  0.456   28 
Table 4, continued 
 
Panel B: Cournot sample 
  LDEBTBV    TDEBTBV    LDEBTMV    TDEBTMV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)    (10)  (11)  (12) 
TANG  0.038  0.039  0.040    0.054  0.058  0.057    0.093  0.094*  0.095*    0.083  0.086  0.086 
  (0.474)  (0.454)  (0.451)    (0.318)  (0.284)  (0.291)    (0.104)  (0.097)  (0.095)    (0.191)  (0.173)  (0.174) 
SIZE  0.011***  0.011***  0.011***    0.004  0.005  0.005    0.012***  0.012***  0.013***    0.007*  0.007*  0.007* 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.003)    (0.314)  (0.249)  (0.254)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.079)  (0.060)  (0.063) 
RISK  -0.134***  -0.122***  -0.121***    -0.098  -0.086  -0.083    -0.163***  -0.157***  -0.154***    -0.205***  -0.196***  -0.192*** 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.006)    (0.227)  (0.279)  (0.294)    (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
NDTS  -0.384**  -0.373**  -0.380**    -0.550***  -0.535**  -0.546***    -0.540***  -0.529***  -0.536***    -0.705***  -0.689***  -0.699*** 
  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.015)    (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.010)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
PROFIT  -0.018  -0.020  -0.021    -0.101  -0.100  -0.104    -0.096**  -0.095**  -0.096***    -0.134***  -0.131***  -0.134*** 
  (0.706)  (0.691)  (0.669)    (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.127)    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)    (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
MTB  0.001  0.002  0.002    0.001  0.002  0.001    -0.012***  -0.011***  -0.012***    -0.017***  -0.016***  -0.017*** 
  (0.601)  (0.567)  (0.583)    (0.709)  (0.649)  (0.695)    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
LIQUID  -0.305***  -0.299***  -0.297***    -0.493***  -0.485***  -0.483***    -0.298***  -0.294***  -0.292***    -0.469***  -0.464***  -0.461*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DEM1  0.029***        0.031**        0.022**        0.030***     
  (0.005)        (0.011)        (0.015)        (0.004)     
COST1  0.012**        0.016**        0.012**        0.018***     
  (0.037)        (0.020)        (0.012)        (0.002)     
DEM2    0.024**        0.029**        0.018**        0.027***   
    (0.020)        (0.016)        (0.035)        (0.010)   
COST2    0.012**        0.015**        0.013***        0.018***   
    (0.030)        (0.022)        (0.007)        (0.001)   
DEM3      0.023**        0.026**        0.018**        0.025** 
      (0.028)        (0.035)        (0.036)        (0.015) 
COST3      0.012**        0.015**        0.013***        0.018*** 
      (0.030)        (0.017)        (0.009)        (0.002) 
No. (2-digit SIC)                               
industry dummies  11  11  11    11  11  11    11  11  11    11  11  11 
Obs  633  633  633    633  633  633    633  633  633    633  633  633 
Between R
2  0.997  0.991  0.989    1.000  0.999  0.999    0.992  0.995  0.996    0.989  0.995  0.996 
Overall R
2  0.327  0.324  0.324    0.339  0.338  0.336    0.528  0.528  0.527    0.528  0.528  0.526 
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Table 5: Capital structure regressions with demand and cost uncertainty – robustness check 
 
This table presents the results of 12 panel data regressions of leverage on conventional capital structure determinants, measures of demand and cost 
uncertainty, and Abs. value CSM, the absolute value of the industry-average competitive strategy measure. Data are from three consecutive periods: 1990-
1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. Other variable definitions are discussed in Table 1. All models include firm random effects. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. White standard errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Panel A: Bertrand sample 
  LDEBTBV    TDEBTBV    LDEBTMV    TDEBTMV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)    (10)  (11)  (12) 
TANG  0.091*  0.091*  0.092*    0.123*  0.122*  0.124*    0.042  0.041  0.042    0.046  0.045  0.046 
  (0.072)  (0.074)  (0.072)    (0.071)  (0.075)  (0.072)    (0.314)  (0.322)  (0.313)    (0.331)  (0.344)  (0.33) 
SIZE  0.015***  0.015***  0.015***    0.008**  0.008**  0.008**    0.008***  0.008***  0.008***    0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.018)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.352)  (0.365)  (0.373) 
RISK  -0.002  0.001  0.001    0.053  0.059  0.061    -0.050  -0.047  -0.047    -0.049  -0.044  -0.043 
  (0.957)  (0.987)  (0.979)    (0.237)  (0.196)  (0.189)    (0.131)  (0.141)  (0.142)    (0.127)  (0.158)  (0.159) 
NDTS  -0.054  -0.039  -0.038    0.043  0.074  0.074    -0.085  -0.069  -0.070    -0.088  -0.063  -0.065 
  (0.818)  (0.868)  (0.872)    (0.899)  (0.827)  (0.827)    (0.619)  (0.689)  (0.682)    (0.733)  (0.807)  (0.802) 
PROFIT  -0.141***  -0.142***  -0.141***    -0.198***  -0.197***  -0.196***    -0.114***  -0.114***  -0.114***    -0.147***  -0.145***  -0.145*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MTB  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002    -0.003  -0.003  -0.003    -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.015***    -0.019***  -0.019***  -0.020*** 
  (0.442)  (0.436)  (0.417)    (0.315)  (0.323)  (0.299)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LIQUID  -0.191***  -0.187***  -0.185***    -0.379***  -0.374***  -0.372***    -0.168***  -0.165***  -0.164***    -0.285***  -0.282***  -0.281*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Abs. value CSM  -0.202  -0.216  -0.217    0.465  0.440  0.439    -0.104  -0.117  -0.117    0.341  0.324  0.324 
  (0.316)  (0.282)  (0.279)    (0.246)  (0.273)  (0.275)    (0.640)  (0.600)  (0.602)    (0.227)  (0.253)  (0.253) 
DEM1  0.012        0.024**        0.010**        0.017***     
  (0.120)        (0.012)        (0.038)        (0.005)     
COST1  -0.001        -0.001        -0.003        -0.002     
  (0.861)        (0.881)        (0.315)        (0.517)     
DEM2    0.009        0.018**        0.006        0.011**   
    (0.211)        (0.034)        (0.193)        (0.038)   
COST2    0.000        0.000        -0.002        -0.001   
    (0.9)        (0.981)        (0.488)        (0.778)   
DEM3      0.007        0.015*        0.006        0.010* 
      (0.338)        (0.081)        (0.197)        (0.059) 
COST3      0.000        0.001        -0.002        0.000 
      (0.947)        (0.815)        (0.519)        (0.867) 
No. (2-digit SIC)                               
industry dummies  12  12  12    12  12  12    12  12  12    12  12  12 
Obs  954  954  954    954  954  954    954  954  954    954  954  954 
Between R
2  0.485  0.469  0.453    0.986  0.988  0.984    0.996  0.997  0.997    0.998  0.997  0.998 
Overall R
2  0.209  0.207  0.207    0.237  0.234  0.233    0.426  0.424  0.424    0.459  0.457  0.457   30 
Table 5, continued 
 
Panel B: Cournot sample 
  LDEBTBV    TDEBTBV    LDEBTMV    TDEBTMV 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)    (10)  (11)  (12) 
TANG  0.036  0.037  0.038    0.051  0.055  0.054    0.092  0.093  0.094    0.081  0.084  0.084 
  (0.497)  (0.477)  (0.473)    (0.348)  (0.312)  (0.318)    (0.111)  (0.104)  (0.101)    (0.204)  (0.186)  (0.186) 
SIZE  0.011***  0.011***  0.011***    0.004  0.005  0.005    0.012***  0.012***  0.012***    0.007*  0.007*  0.007* 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.003)    (0.324)  (0.26)  (0.264)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.082)  (0.062)  (0.065) 
RISK  -0.127***  -0.116***  -0.114**    -0.087  -0.075  -0.072    -0.158***  -0.152***  -0.149***    -0.197***  -0.189***  -0.184*** 
  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.011)    (0.290)  (0.348)  (0.369)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)    (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
NDTS  -0.438***  -0.427***  -0.435***    -0.641***  -0.624***  -0.638***    -0.579***  -0.568***  -0.575***    -0.763***  -0.746***  -0.759*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)    (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
PROFIT  -0.022  -0.024  -0.025    -0.107  -0.106  -0.110    -0.099***  -0.098***  -0.099***    -0.138***  -0.135***  -0.139*** 
  (0.649)  (0.633)  (0.613)    (0.107)  (0.115)  (0.104)    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)    (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
MTB  0.002  0.002  0.002    0.001  0.002  0.002    -0.012***  -0.011***  -0.011***    -0.017***  -0.016***  -0.017*** 
  (0.568)  (0.542)  (0.556)    (0.664)  (0.616)  (0.66)    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
LIQUID  -0.311***  -0.305***  -0.303***    -0.503***  -0.495***  -0.493***    -0.302***  -0.299***  -0.296***    -0.476***  -0.470***  -0.467*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Abs. value CSM  0.581  0.578  0.593    0.972*  0.954*  0.981**    0.412  0.410  0.420    0.623  0.613  0.634 
  (0.172)  (0.177)  (0.164)    (0.052)  (0.058)  (0.049)    (0.419)  (0.419)  (0.407)    (0.304)  (0.309)  (0.291) 
DEM1  0.028***        0.029**        0.021**        0.029***     
  (0.007)        (0.016)        (0.018)        (0.006)     
COST1  0.013**        0.017**        0.013**        0.018***     
  (0.030)        (0.015)        (0.011)        (0.002)     
DEM2    0.023**        0.027**        0.018**        0.026**   
    (0.026)        (0.023)        (0.041)        (0.012)   
COST2    0.013**        0.016**        0.013***        0.019***   
    (0.024)        (0.016)        (0.007)        (0.001)   
DEM3      0.022**        0.024**        0.018**        0.024** 
      (0.035)        (0.047)        (0.042)        (0.019) 
COST3      0.012**        0.016**        0.013***        0.018*** 
      (0.024)        (0.013)        (0.009)        (0.002) 
No. (2-digit SIC)                               
industry dummies  11  11  11    11  11  11    11  11  11    11  11  11 
Obs  633  633  633    633  633  633    633  633  633    633  633  633 
Between R
2  0.999  0.995  0.994    0.997  0.998  0.999    0.989  0.993  0.995    0.986  0.992  0.993 
Overall R
2  0.329  0.326  0.326    0.343  0.342  0.340    0.529  0.528  0.528    0.529  0.529  0.528 
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∗   A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
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